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NO EXIT: TEN YEARS OF  




Privacy and free speech are often described as oppositional forces. This 
Essay analyzes First Amendment jurisprudence emphasizing the ten years 
after Sorrell vs. IMS Health was decided in 2011. In this Essay, Hans 
contextualizes First Amendment challenges to privacy laws. Hans cautions 
that the Supreme Court has moved perilously close towards a jurisprudence 
under which privacy laws are nearly impossible to craft.  Hans demonstrates 
that the need for privacy regulation can satisfy a strict scrutiny standard of 
review. Hans argues that the stakes for privacy are incredibly high and 
warrant careful consideration by the Supreme Court. 
  
 
*   Assistant Clinical Professor of Law and Director, Stanton Foundation First Amendment 
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A decade has passed since the U.S. Supreme Court held in Sorrell vs. 
IMS Health that a Vermont privacy law violated the First Amendment.1 
Somewhat surprisingly, the debate about the intersection between privacy 
laws and free speech protections has not progressed much in the intervening 
years. If anything, the concerns that some privacy advocates had following 
Sorrell—that the First Amendment could be used as a tool to overturn 
privacy regulations—have extended to other areas of economic regulation.2 
As a public interest attorney working on technology law and policy, I 
entered into practice not long after Sorrell was decided, when it seemed that 
privacy laws might not survive the Supreme Court’s ever-expanding First 
Amendment jurisprudence.3 It has been dispiriting to see that, in the 
intervening years, not much has changed. Free speech advocates continue 
to claim that privacy laws raise significant, if not fatal, First Amendment 
issues.4 Privacy experts argue not only for the constitutionality of privacy 
laws, but also their increased necessity in a digital economy.5 
Amidst this backdrop, new First Amendment challenges to privacy 
proliferate even as the Supreme Court continues to expand the scope of First 
 
1.   564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
2.   See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (invalidating portions of the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act on First Amendment grounds); Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 
Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (invalidating mandatory public-sector union fees), Nat’l Inst. of Fam. 
& Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (invalidating California’s FACT Act, which required 
crisis pregnancy centers to provide notices that California provided free or low-cost services, including 
abortion). 
3.   See, e.g., Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57 (2014) (arguing that data 
should be considered speech and that data privacy laws should be subject to First Amendment scrutiny). 
4.   See, e.g., Memorandum from Andrew J. Pincus et al., Mayer Brown, to Christopher Mohr, 
Gen. Counsel of Software & Info. Indus. Ass’n (Jan. 24, 2019), 
http://www.siia.net/Portals/0/pdf/Policy/Data%20Driven%20Innovation/Memo%20re%20CCPA.pdf?
ver=2019-01-25-163504-003 [https://perma.cc/YJ4E-WPUY] [hereinafter SIIA Memo] (arguing that the 
California Consumer Privacy Act violates the First Amendment on multiple grounds—that it cannot 
pass even intermediate scrutiny, that it is impermissibly vague, and that it is viewpoint- and content-
discriminatory). 
5.   See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski & Scott Skinner-Thompson, Free Speech Isn’t a Free Pass 
for Privacy Violations, SLATE (Mar. 9, 2020), https://slate.com/technology/2020/03/free-speech-
privacy-clearview-ai-maine-isps.html [https://perma.cc/LN67-MDNF] (arguing that First Amendment 
rights are supported rather than imperiled by privacy regulations); Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards, 
Getting the First Amendment Wrong, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 4, 2020), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/09/04/opinion/getting-first-amendment-wrong/ 
[https://perma.cc/FS3V-5MQG] (criticizing Clearview AI’s arguments that Illinois’ Biometric 








2021] No Exit: Ten Years of “Privacy vs. Speech” Post-Sorrell 21 
 
 
Amendment protections. Is privacy law under existential threat?6 And how 
can that be given the increased concerns and public attention to the lack of 
effective federal privacy regulation? This Essay seeks to contextualize the 
First Amendment challenges to privacy laws, arguing that the government’s 
need to protect individual privacy is more persuasive than ever. It also 
sounds a note of caution, observing how the Supreme Court’s recent 
hesitancy to go all-in on upending related doctrinal areas like commercial 
speech and standing demonstrates an understanding that putting privacy 
laws at risk might be a bridge too far. The Essay hopes to persuade that 
when it comes to privacy, the Court should decline to forestall meaningful, 
vital privacy regulation at the state and federal levels by using the First 
Amendment as a cudgel. By doing so, I hope to move beyond the Sartrean 
trap that we seem to have found ourselves in post-Sorrell, in which privacy 
and speech are hopelessly, endlessly pitted as oppositional.7 
Part I of the Essay discusses the recent background of the privacy and 
speech debate, from the early 2000s to Sorrell and its aftermath. Part II 
analyzes the state of First Amendment law post-Sorrell to see if a path out 
of the mess exists, arguing that the need for privacy regulation should satisfy 
First Amendment scrutiny, even under a strict scrutiny standard, given 
contemporary concerns about privacy and data that have only increased in 
the decade since Sorrell. Part III briefly discusses cases and situations 
juxtaposing the First Amendment and privacy statutes in an effort to endorse 
a view of such statutes that allows them to satisfy First Amendment review. 
I conclude by examining standing—another doctrinal area in which the 
Court has shown a desire to upend existing doctrine, only to avoid doing so, 
in the hopes of seeing a path forward for privacy law even in a world in 
which the Court has not shied away from using the First Amendment to 
 
6.   In this Essay, I used the terms “privacy”, “privacy laws”, and “privacy regulations” as a 
shorthand to refer to federal and state laws and regulations that restrict the collection, use, and retention 
of data relating to individuals. Privacy is a notoriously contested concept in American law that has defied 
easy definition for over a half-century. See, e.g., SARAH IGO, THE KNOWN CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF 
PRIVACY IN MODERN AMERICA 5–12 (2018) (surveying the contested, complex landscape of “privacy” 
as used in the United States throughout its history and particularly in recent years). 
7.   Jean-Paul Sartre’s 1944 play No Exit (Huis Clos) depicts three characters trapped in a 
room unable to escape. Eventually they determine that the room is Hell and that their punishment is to 
be stuck with each other for eternity, which prompts one character to note that “hell is other people.” In 
my view, the long-running debate—with little appreciable progress—regarding whether privacy laws 
and First Amendment doctrine can co-exist has more than a passing resemblance to the play’s infinite, 
static environment. 
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invalidate government action. 
It is always difficult, and perhaps unwise, to try to predict whether and 
how the courts will move on a particular issue. Nevertheless, the stakes for 
privacy are incredibly high and warrant careful consideration from the 
Court. The Court should not recklessly extend the First Amendment and 
foreclose the possibility for meaningful privacy regulation on constitutional 
grounds. It’s not too late to find a path out of the room where we find privacy 
and speech inexorably conflicted. 
 
I.  “PRIVACY VS. SPEECH” AND SORRELL  
 
Most of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence dates to 
within the last hundred years or so, beginning with foundational decisions 
in Schenck v. United States,8 Abrams v. United States,9 and Whitney v. 
California.10 These cases established the First Amendment as a limit on the 
government’s ability to regulate or restrict speech. 
“Because many of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment decisions are 
relatively recent, the intersection of privacy regulation and speech rights did 
not receive much judicial or scholarly attention until recent decades.11 There 
are a number of First Amendment categories potentially implicated by 
privacy regulations. Do privacy laws regulate conduct or speech?12 If such 
laws regulate the former, they likely do not trigger First Amendment 
scrutiny. Are privacy laws properly classified as commercial speech 
regulations, triggering intermediate scrutiny? Or are they content-based 
restrictions that justify strict scrutiny analysis? Or do privacy laws 
discriminate based on viewpoint, which would make them presumptively 
unconstitutional? 
These questions demonstrate making a general determination on 
whether privacy laws pass First Amendment scrutiny may be impossible. 
 
8.   249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
9.   250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
10.   274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969). 
11.   Some Supreme Court cases, like Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) and Cox 
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) address the intersection of free speech and privacy 
torts. The privacy interests in those cases thus fall under individualized tort theories rather than statutory 
regimes designed to protect privacy for the public at large by governing data practices. 
12.   See, e.g., Davey Alba, A.C.L.U. Accuses Clearview AI of Privacy “Nightmare Scenario”, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2020) (describing an ACLU argument that relevant parts of Illinois’ Biometric 
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Too much will ride on the specific provisions of the law at issue. Having 
said that, critics note that privacy laws are poor fits for existing categories, 
implying that the easier paths (arguing that privacy laws implicate content 
and not speech, or that they are purely commercial regulations) are 
foreclosed. I am of the belief that privacy laws should not automatically fall 
into the category of content-based regulations—but that even if a privacy 
law did, it would be possible to satisfy strict scrutiny. 
In 2000, Eugene Volokh wrote an influential article asserting that 
privacy protections raised serious, potentially fatal, First Amendment 
concerns.13 Volokh argued that existing free speech doctrines—including 
the commercial speech and speech on matters of private concern—provided 
a poor fit for privacy laws and that it would be difficult for such laws to 
meet the First Amendment’s strict scrutiny test requiring a compelling 
government interest and narrow tailoring.14 Moreover, changing existing 
doctrines to allow for privacy regulation, in Volokh’s view, would create a 
host of problems for other areas of protected speech.15 As such, he 
“reluctantly” concluded, it would not be possible to create information 
privacy rules that withstood First Amendment scrutiny.16 
Unsurprisingly, privacy advocates vehemently disagreed. Paul 
Schwartz’s response to Volokh’s article critiqued its framing of fair 
information practice principles.17 More robustly, Neil Richards’ 2005 article 
Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment provided a competing 
vision of how privacy laws can survive First Amendment challenges.18 
Richards contested Volokh’s interpretation of First Amendment doctrine, 
arguing that privacy and speech can be reconciled, as privacy laws either 
failed to implicate First Amendment speech or were permissible under 
existing doctrine.19 Richards observed that treating privacy laws as fatally 
flawed under First Amendment scrutiny would allow for an unwinding of 
the core constitutional distinctions between economic and political rights 
 
13.   Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications 
of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000). 
14.   Id. at 1052. 
15.   Id. 
16.   Id. at 1053. 
17.   Paul M. Schwartz, Free Speech vs. Information Privacy: Eugene Volokh’s First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1559 (2000). 
18.   Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 
1149 (2005). 
19.   Id. at 1151. 
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that have existed for decades.20 Was the Court willing to go that far, dressing 
up economic rights as political ones, as Richards frames the question?21 
Sorrell changed the dynamics of this debate, though it provided few 
answers. The case arose out of IMS Health’s challenge to Vermont’s 
Prescription Confidentiality Law, which prohibited the sale, disclosure, and 
use of pharmacy records that revealed the prescribing practices of individual 
doctors.22 Vermont enacted the statute in order to protect individual privacy, 
as many pharmacies sold subscription information to data miners, who 
would then sell information to companies for advertising and marketing 
purposes.23 According to Justice Anthony Kennedy, who penned the 
majority opinion, the Prescription Confidentiality Law was designed to 
prevent a “one-sided” system in which private industries were able to 
persuade doctors via expensive marketing campaigns with no 
countervailing information.24 
Such a system, Justice Kennedy concluded, violated the First 
Amendment.25 In Kennedy’s view, the Vermont statute was both content- 
and viewpoint-discriminatory, making it subject to strict scrutiny and almost 
certainly invalid.26 Even under Vermont’s reasoning that the law burdened 
only commercial speech and was thus entitled to intermediate scrutiny, 
Kennedy determined that the statute’s many defects meant that it could not 
withstand even a more deferential review.27 In effect, because Kennedy 
identified viewpoint discrimination in the statute, it was presumptively 
unconstitutional even it were a mere commercial speech regulation. 
What makes Sorrell a potential Trojan horse (or overdue invitation, 
depending on one’s perspective) to subsequent invalidation of privacy 
statutes on constitutional grounds? Justice Kennedy’s opinion contains dicta 
that seemed poised to reframe whether and how privacy can be regulated. 
For example, Kennedy asserted that “there is a strong argument that 
prescriber-identifying information is speech for First Amendment 
 
20.   Id. at 1217–21. 
21.   Id. at 1220. 
22.   Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011) (citing Vt. Stat. Ann., tit. 18, § 4631 
(2010)). 
23.   Id. at 557–61. 
24.   Id. at 560–61. 
25.   Id. at 557. 
26.   Id. at 571. 
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purposes”28 This nearly states that such data is speech, and thus challenging 
to regulate within the bounds of the First Amendment, as a law regulating 
data would need to withstand strict scrutiny analysis.  
Yet Kennedy’s opinion unfavorably compared the Prescription 
Confidentiality Law to HIPAA (the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act), which it described as a “more coherent policy.”29 
Because HIPAA also regulates health privacy (the putative goal of the 
Vermont statute), the implication is that the constitutional infirmities of the 
Prescription Confidentiality Law might have been mitigated with better 
drafting.30 The lesson here, effectively, is that bad statutes make bad law. 
Commentators post-Sorrell have focused on what the majority opinion, 
as well as subsequent developments in First Amendment jurisprudence, 
have meant for the possibility of privacy regulation in the United States. 
This is particularly true as calls for baseline privacy protections increased 
in the years following the proliferation of smartphones, the rise of the so-
called “Internet of Things,” and the Snowden disclosures.31 Shortly after 
Sorrell, Ashutosh Bhagwat observed that the decision might signal the death 
of privacy regulation given the challenges of withstanding strict scrutiny.32 
Bhagwat instead argued for the Court to treat personal data as less necessary 
to the democratic ideals of the First Amendment, and thus permit some 
regulation at a less exacting standard than strict scrutiny.33 
Jane Bambauer took a bold approach in her 2014 article Is Data 
Speech?, concluding that Sorrell’s reasoning very nearly resolves the titular 
question via the dicta discussed above—and that the answer should be 
 
28.   Id. at 570. 
29.   Id. at 573. This framing is similar to that of Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 
521 U.S. 457 (1997), as interpreted by United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001), which 
upheld a “comprehensive” statutory program that had multiple other regulatory features (such as an 
antitrust exemption to allow for detailed coordinated marketing orders). Id. at 411–16. 
30.   Justice Stephen Breyer’s Sorrell dissent did not focus on the question of data as speech; 
instead, it discussed the Glickman framework and questioning the exacting scrutiny standard that the 
majority used in analyzing the Vermont statute. Justice Kennedy’s troubling dicta thus went largely 
unaddressed in the case. 564 U.S. 552, 580–603 (2011) (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
31.   See, e.g., Ctr. For Democracy & Tech., Federal Privacy Legislation, 
https://cdt.org/collections/federal-privacy-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/7EC3-7V83] (calling for a 
federal privacy law to protect individual data). 
32.   Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of Privacy, 
36 VT. L. REV. 855, 871 (2012). 
33.   Id. at 876–79. 







26 Washington University Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 65 
 
“Yes.”34 Bambauer treated the possibility of a world in which privacy 
regulations that restrict data merit strict scrutiny analysis with sanguinity, 
asserting that governments can still craft narrower privacy protections under 
her framework.35 Because Bambauer saw few issues with the possibility of 
massive data collection—indeed, she welcomed it36—her vision of a world 
in which privacy laws that focused on use restrictions and other more 
specialized tools bears little resemblance to the more robust versions of 
privacy laws that scholars and advocates have called for. Whether privacy 
meaningfully survives under Bambauer’s vision is about as open a question 
as whether Justice Kennedy thought data was speech.37 
Neil Richards returned to the issue of the relationship between privacy 
and speech post-Sorrell in a 2015 article, arguing that endorsing a robust 
reading of Sorrell would lead to a destabilization of the post-New Deal 
constitutional order.38 Richards’ reading of Sorrell focused on two 
elements: first, how the invalidation was arguably necessitated by the 
Prescription Confidentiality Law’s poor drafting and the Supreme Court’s 
decision in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul;39 and second, the implication that the 
sale of a database constituted speech.40 Richards connects these two 
elements to argue that, like R.A.V., the real issue in Sorrell was viewpoint 
discrimination rather than content discrimination. In effect, under Richards’ 
view, had Vermont drafted a better law that didn’t discriminate against 
marketers, the Court might not have held it unconstitutional.41  
More pointedly, Richards rebuts the “Data = Speech” argument by 
analogizing First Amendment jurisprudence to equal protection doctrine 
and its focus on laws that discriminate against suspect classifications, rather 
than a concern with any kind of discrimination.42 Endorsing Frederick 
 
34.   Bambauer, supra note 3, at 71. Bambauer describes Kennedy’s hesitancy to “pull the 
trigger” as perhaps rooted in “the broad and unanticipated consequences that such a declaration might 
bring about.” Id. Her Article, in part, seems intended to assuage those concerns.  
35.   Id. at 110–17. 
36.   Id. at 102–05. 
37.   For example, Bambauer critiqued longstanding privacy and data regulations like the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act and HIPAA, implying that specific cases or social costs demonstrated that its 
provisions could not stand up to strict scrutiny. Id. at 113–14.  
38.   Neil M. Richards, Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1501, 1507–08 (2015). 
39.   505 U.S. 377 (1992).  
40.   Richards, supra note 38, at 1519–21. 
41.   Id. at 1523. 
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Schauer’s view that law permissibly restricts all kinds of speech without 
triggering First Amendment scrutiny (such as sexual harassment, securities 
regulation, or antitrust),43 Richards argues that privacy law can fit easily 
within this frame. If it can’t, the spectre of Lochner looms.44 
Other scholarship has analyzed the effects of Sorrell from a variety of 
perspectives, from algorithms to health care, but the core debate has 
remained focused on the issues described by Volokh, Richards, Bhagwat, 
and Bambauer. Because the Supreme Court has not since analyzed a privacy 
law from a free speech lens since Sorrell, and due to major shifts in the 
Court’s membership in the intervening decade, the debate has not 
significantly progressed despite the many changes in regulation and 
technology.45 
 
II.  POST-SORRELL ANALYSIS: LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT  
 
While the Supreme Court has not refined its analysis on how to balance 
the values of privacy and speech post-Sorrell, its rulings in other First 
Amendment cases, alongside analyses of state level privacy regulations, 
show the potential, somewhat rocky path forward for privacy regulations 
even amidst more searching First Amendment scrutiny. It is difficult, as 
always, to predict where the Supreme Court will go—particularly when it 
comes to free speech doctrine, which seems to become more vexing and 
convoluted each term. Nevertheless, I hope that by sketching an exit out of 
the fugue state we find ourselves in, the necessity of bolstering privacy laws 
ex ante will become more apparent. 
A trio of First Amendment cases decided by the Supreme Court post-
Sorrell provide some guidance as to how the Court might analyze a privacy 
law. First, and most worryingly, Reed v. Town of Gilbert created a tougher 
 
43.   Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration 
of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769–71 (2004). 
44.   Richards, supra note 38, at 1519–21. Richards notes that Justice Breyer’s dissenting 
opinion also emphasizes this Lochnerization concern. Id. at 1530 (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 
131 S. Ct. 2653, 2685 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
45.   The Rorschach-like ambiguity of Justice Kennedy’s Sorrell opinion comes under criticism 
from different sides in this debate, and perhaps demonstrates why the debate remains both polarized and 
somewhat stagnant. See Bambauer, supra note 3, at 117 (describing Justice Kennedy’s analysis as 
“facile” and “underdeveloped”); Richards, supra note 38, at 1521 (describing the majority opinion as 
“hardly a model of clarity”). Perhaps the one part of Sorrell we can all agree on is that the majority 
opinion is unsatisfying at best. 
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landscape for governments to defend laws that may affect speech.46 Justice 
Thomas’ majority opinion held that laws that are content-based—even if 
they are only “subtle” in doing so, and even if they seem facially content-
neutral—invariably warrant strict scrutiny, and government justifications 
are irrelevant.47 One way to describe this is that the court must look deeply 
and longingly at the law’s face to determine if it is content-based, even if it 
seems not to be at first glance.  
This potentially raises problems for privacy regulations, particularly if 
challengers to those arguments are successfully able to cast such regulations 
as content-based—even those that seem content-neutral. As Genevieve 
Lakier noted, one consequence is that it is now “much more difficult than 
previously for the government to defend facially content-based regulations 
of speech against constitutional challenge.”48 Justice Kennedy’s Sorrell 
opinion may provide ballast for challengers on this front.49 It would not be 
a stretch for a challenger to argue that even a privacy law that seems content-
neutral actually is content-based. 
Second, Matal v. Tam50 demonstrates the Court’s continued 
unhappiness with Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission, the 1980 case that set out a four-factor test for analyzing 
whether “commercial speech” regulations were constitutional.51 Tam 
concerned a First Amendment challenge to the Lanham Act’s 
Disparagement Clause, which prohibited disparaging trademarks from 
being registered under federal law.52 In a hopelessly fractured opinion, the 
court held that, while it could not agree on what standard applied to the 
 
46.   135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
47.   Id. at 2227. 
48.   Genevieve Lakier, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona and the Rise of the Anti-
Classificatory First Amendment, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 235. There are some indications that lower 
courts have not read Reed as fully or broadly as critics feared they might. Dan V. Koslowski & Derigan 
Silver, Measuring Reed’s Reach: Content Discrimination in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals After 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 24 COMM. L. & POL’Y 191, 192 (2019) (examining how lower courts have 
interpreted Reed and arguing that it “has not been the basis of a First Amendment revolution.”). 
49.   Lakier observes that the appellee’s justifications for the law at issue in Reed were 
particularly ill-articulated, though that was in part based on what the lower courts believed the relevant 
standard required. Lakier, supra note 48, at 254–56. In that way, at the very least, Reed is similar to 
Sorrell—with its poorly drafted statutory language—in that a bad situation leads to a potentially radical 
result. 
50.   137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
51.   447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
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Lanham Act, because the law was viewpoint discriminatory it could not 
satisfy even the Central Hudson test.53 The Court’s decades-long 
ambivalence54 with the Central Hudson framework again rose to the fore, 
with Justice Alito’s plurality opinion stating that “the line between 
commercial and non-commercial speech is not always clear.”55  
Whether commercial speech has much viability left as a category seems 
uncertain, and, coupled with Reed, laws that regulate commercial activity 
might be much more likely in the future to be subject in large part or in 
entirety to strict scrutiny rather than Central Hudson’s more relaxed 
intermediate scrutiny standard. Whether a privacy law would even be 
categorized as commercial speech regulation is uncertain—and would likely 
depend on context56—but it seems unlikely that post-Sorrell and post-Tam 
the Court would be very deferential to the government’s defenses of such a 
law. 
Third, Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar may provide some unlikely 
optimism.57 While some have characterized strict scrutiny as “strict in 
theory, and fatal in fact,”58 the Court itself has sought to dispel the notion 
that strict scrutiny means a de facto invalidation of the law at issue.59 
Williams-Yulee involves the rare First Amendment case where a statute 
 
53.   Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1764–65. 
54.   See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367–68 (2002) (observing that 
“several Members of the Court have expressed doubts about the Central Hudson analysis and whether 
it should apply in particular cases”). 
55.   Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1765. 
56.   See Richards, supra note 18, at 1172–74; Bambauer, supra note 3, at 105–06 (describing 
how different types of privacy regulation might trigger different scrutiny standards). Bambauer asserts 
that data should not be subject to a lower form of scrutiny (namely, rational basis review). Id. While I 
disagree with that categorical statement, I think it difficult to read Sorrell and the Supreme Court’s 
subsequent First Amendment moves and feel confident that the Court will construe a privacy law as 
requiring anything less than intermediate scrutiny. 
57.   575 U.S. 433 (2015). 
58.   This phrase was first coined by the late Gerald Gunther. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme 
Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a 
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). For an empirical analysis of how federal courts 
have actually applied the strict scrutiny test in a less aggressive way than in Gunther’s framework, see 
Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the 
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 795 (2006) (“Reporting the results of a census of every strict 
scrutiny decision published by the district, circuit, and Supreme courts between 1990 and 2003, this 
study shows that strict scrutiny is far from the inevitably deadly test imagined by the Gunther myth and 
more closely resembles the context-sensitive tool described by O'Connor.”). 
59.   Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (“Finally, we wish to dispel 
the notion that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”). 
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survives strict scrutiny and the only Supreme Court free speech case post-
Sorrell in which a strict scrutiny analysis did not lead to the statute’s 
invalidation.60 Williams-Yulee concerned a judicial candidate’s solicitation 
of campaign funds during a judicial election. After Yulee, the candidate, 
lost her primary election, the Florida Bar filed a complaint against her for 
violating the relevant ethical rule that required her to comply with the Code 
of Judicial Conduct’s ban on direct solicitation of campaign funds.61 Yulee 
asserted that the Florida Bar could not discipline her because her actions 
were protected by the First Amendment.62  
While—once again—the case lacked a clear majority opinion, Chief 
Justice Roberts’ opinion found that Florida’s restrictions on direct 
solicitation were narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government 
interest.63 This result might seem inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 
recent jurisprudence on campaign finance regulation, but Roberts insisted 
that judicial candidates were fundamentally different than legislative and 
executive elections.64 The public’s need for confidence in the judicial 
system meant that Florida’s interest was compelling; the rule itself was 
found to be narrowly tailored.65 As such, Florida prevailed. 
The case is striking for the obvious reason—the Supreme Court rarely 
 
60.   The free speech cases that have used a strict scrutiny analysis post-Sorrell are Williams-
Yulee; Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011); Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011); U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012); Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015); Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 
(2018); and Barr v. Amer. Assoc. of Pol. Consultants, 140 S.Ct. 2335 (2020). All of these cases, except 
Williams-Yulee, led to the invalidation of the statutory language at issue. 
In McCutcheon v. Fed. Elec. Comm’n, the court did not specify which standard of review it was 
applying, as the statute at issue could not satisfy even a lower standard of review than strict scrutiny. 
572 U.S. 185, 199 (2014). The Court similarly ruled in Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 
Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2465 (2018).  
In Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744 (2017), the court failed to determine what standard applied to a 
provision of the Lanham Act, determining that the law could not withstand First Amendment review if 
it was viewpoint based. In Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. 2294 (2019), the Court declared that a different, 
parallel provision of the Lanham Act was per se unconstitutional once it determined that the provision 
was viewpoint discriminatory; it did not engage in any analysis under a standard of review. 
61.   Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 441. 
62.   Id. 
63.   Id. at 444. 
64.   Id. at 446. One might ask why this might be. Are elected judges special? Is there a special 
solicitude involving the integrity of the judiciary that differs from the legislative and executive branches? 
One cannot say with any certainty, but given Chief Justice Roberts’ role as the highest-ranking member 
of the federal judiciary it may be that his view on the role of judges differs from his view on the role of 
other elected political officials. 
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determines that a statute can survive strict scrutiny review. Before Williams-
Yulee, the last time it had done so was five years prior in Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, a case involving national security and political 
speech.66 One can interpret this skimpy record as demonstrating that it is 
only in exceedingly rare situations, involving special circumstances like 
protecting national security or the need for an impartial judiciary, that the 
Court will allow a statute to withstand strict scrutiny. Perhaps. But why 
can’t privacy regulation fall into that category? 
We know that the Court takes privacy and data rights seriously because 
of recent decisions involving law enforcement access to data. In Riley v. 
California, the Court unanimously ruled that warrantless searches of cell 
phones violated the Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable searches and 
seizures.67 Relevant to the Court’s analysis was the sheer volume of data 
that a cell phone can now carry.68  
Concerns about the location tracking capabilities of cell phones also 
influenced the Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United States, which 
concerned government collection of cell-site location information (CSLI).69 
Carpenter held that individuals retained a privacy expectation in their CSLI 
and that the government needed to obtain a warrant in order to collect it.70 
These cases establish that the Court is not likely to unthinkingly disregard 
privacy as an important government interest, and potentially a compelling 
one. The social and political concerns that have proliferated in the decade 
post-Sorrell demonstrate that the need for effective privacy regulation is 
greater than ever.71  
While ex post facto justifications for compelling government interests 
are unlikely to persuade courts, I point to specific events here as merely a 
selection of justifications that governments might employ in order to meet 
 
66.   561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
67.   573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
68.   Id. at 393–97 (describing the privacy concerns that result from the vast amounts of data 
that a cell phone can contain). 
69.   138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
70.   Id. at 2216–21. 
71.   Perhaps the most notorious example is the Cambridge Analytica scandal, which involved 
a Facebook user data that was improperly obtained and used to create targeted voter profiles of 
Americans. See Nicholas Confessore, Cambridge Analytica and Facebook: The Scandal and the Fallout 
So Far, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-
analytica-scandal-fallout.html [https://perma.cc/J8V2-BFED] (providing a timeline of coverage to date 
and describing how Cambridge Analytica had obtained the Facebook data). 
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this element of First Amendment scrutiny. Every law is different, and in 
general, the parade of horribles that the last decade has brought 
demonstrates that governments must be ever more engaged on these 
complex questions of privacy regulation. 
Predicting what will happen in hypothetical Supreme Court cases is 
chancy at best. While I believe that privacy regulations should not be 
automatically subjected to strict scrutiny review, I am sufficiently 
concerned about the state of the law to note that it is a distinct possibility 
that the Supreme Court will opt to apply that standard, especially given Reed 
and Tam. Williams-Yulee demonstrates the continued, if remote, possibility 
that the Court can uphold a law challenged on First Amendment grounds 
under strict scrutiny review. The government’s interest in promoting 
individual privacy seems sufficiently compelling—at least to withstand that 
part of strict scrutiny analysis. Narrow tailoring will, of course, depend upon 
the law at issue. 
Recent cases demonstrate how lower courts have addressed Sorrell’s 
effects on privacy regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds. The 
record is not sufficiently robust to demonstrate a general trajectory for these 
challenges, but to date, an expansive reading of Sorrell has not gained much 
traction.  
 
III. PRIVACY LAWS AND FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES  
 
A few well-reported challenges to privacy laws provide some visibility 
into how courts and attorneys have addressed the privacy and speech puzzle 
post-Sorrell. They provide a glimpse of what the future might hold for cases 
that raise First Amendment challenges to privacy laws. 
In 2018, California enacted the California Consumer Privacy Act 
(CCPA),72 designed to protect Californians from privacy violations and to 
promote consumer protection.73 Several technology companies opposed this 
effort,74 and in January 2019, three Mayer Brown attorneys (including 
Eugene Volokh) drafted a memo to the Software and Information Industry 
 
72.   Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.100-199 (2018). 
73.   See Daisuke Wakabayashi, Silicon Valley Faces Regulatory Fight on Its Home Turf, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/13/business/california-data-privacy-ballot-
measure.html [https://perma.cc/B5EF-FG62] (describing the fight over the CCPA, which initially began 
as a ballot initiative and later was enacted into law by the legislature). 
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Association (SIIA) arguing that the CCPA violated the First Amendment on 
multiple grounds.75 The SIIA Memo asserted that the CCPA failed to 
advance a compelling or even substantial government interest (thus failing 
even intermediate scrutiny); that it was impermissibly vague; and that it was 
both content- and viewpoint-discriminatory.76 The SIIA Memo sought to 
categorize the CCPA as fatally flawed—perhaps in order to prompt 
subsequent modifications to the law prior to its effective date of 
enforcement.77 In March 2020, SIIA continued to argue that provisions of 
the CCPA remained unconstitutional despite modifications that had been 
made by the legislature.78 Because of the uncertainty posed by the California 
Privacy Rights Act, a recently enacted November 2020 California ballot 
initiative, it remains unclear as to whether and how these alleged 
constitutional infirmities will be cured, or if SIIA or another plaintiff will 
challenge the CCPA on First Amendment grounds.79 
SIIA’s arguments fail to engage with the holdings from Glickman and 
United Foods, which state that a comprehensive statutory regime that 
incidentally burdens speech does not fail First Amendment review.80 
Indeed, this formulation was referenced in Sorrell in Justice Kennedy’s 
unfavorable comparison of Vermont’s statute against HIPAA.81 A court 
could certainly interpret the CCPA as being more akin to HIPAA or the 
program described in Glickman than to the Vermont statute in Sorrell. 
SIIA’s arguments could also potentially imperil the Fair Credit 
 
75.   See SIIA Memo, supra note 4.  
76.   Id. 
77.   SIIA was partially successful on the front. See SIIA Privacy Update: The CCPA, the 
Public Domain, and the First Amendment, SIIA (Mar. 2020), https://www.siia.net/Divisions/Public-
Policy-Advocacy-Services/Priorities/Privacy-and-Data-Security/SIIA-Privacy-Update-The-CCPA-the-
Public-Domain-and-the-First-Amendment [https://perma.cc/X8YS-JSSE]. 
78.   Sara C. DePaul, SIIA Comments on the Second Set of Modifications to the Proposed Text 
of the CCPA Regulations, SIIA (Mar. 27, 2020), 
https://www.siia.net/Portals/0/pdf/Policy/Privacy%20and%20Data%20Security/SIIA%20Comments%
20on%20CCPA%20Regs%2027%20MAR.pdf?ver=2020-03-30-102111-393 [https://perma.cc/886L-
8C69] (arguing for the exclusion of publicly available information that is published in “widely 
distributed media”). 
79.   See Allison Grande, As Final Calif. Privacy Regs Drop, Enforcement Fights Loom, 
LAW360 (June 12, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1282100/as-final-calif-privacy-regs-drop-
enforcement-fights-loom [https://perma.cc/T2P2-NZEA]. 
80.   See United States v. United Foods Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 411–12 (2001); Glickman v. 
Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 469 (1997). 
81.   Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 573 (2011); see supra notes 29–30 and 
accompanying text. 
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Reporting Act (FCRA),82 which contains a provision preventing credit 
reporting agencies from disclosing information about consumers after a 
period of years (generally seven), with some exceptions.83 Under the SIIA 
reading, FCRA’s mandatory deletion requirement of factual public 
information would also violate the First Amendment. While there have been 
challenges to FCRA’s constitutionality on this front,84 courts have held that 
its statutory scheme is sufficiently robust and deliberate to withstand First 
Amendment scrutiny.85 Turning away from that jurisprudence would be a 
seismic misstep. 
A recent case in Maine demonstrates how courts have interpreted First 
Amendment challenges to privacy laws. In early 2020, a group of 
telecommunications companies filed a challenge to a Maine law that 
required Internet service providers (ISPs) to obtain approval from customers 
before selling or using their personal information.86 The ISPs alleged, 
amongst other claims, that the law violated the First Amendment in part 
because it discriminated against them but not against other speakers, 
regulated content, and could not meet strict scrutiny or even an intermediate 
scrutiny standard.87 
The District Court did not accept these arguments, ruling against the 
plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. While the Court 
acknowledged that the case had a limited record at the time, it quickly 
dismissed with the First Amendment claims, which it described as a “shoot-
 
82.   15 U.S.C. § 1681. 
83.   15 U.S.C. § 1681(c). 
84.   See King v. Gen. Info. Servs., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 303 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (denying motion 
to dismiss case against consumer reporting agency on First Amendment grounds). King v. GIS gained 
some notoriety as the first post-Sorrell case to argue that Sorrell’s holding meant that FCRA was 
unconstitutional. GIS’ motion to dismiss failed on this ground, as the trial court found that FCRA was 
“a more coherent policy” than the law at issue in Sorrell and that it passed commercial speech review. 
Id. at 309–13. The case was ultimately settled. General Information Services Announces Settlement of 
King v. GIS and Dowell v. GIS, BUSINESSWIRE (June 20, 2014), 
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20140620005074/en/General-Information-Services-
Announces-Settlement-King-v [https://perma.cc/F5PK-D4Q9]. 
85.   See, e.g., Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 245 F.3d 809 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting First 
Amendment challenge to FCRA); Trans Union LLC v. FTC, 295 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (rejecting 
First Amendment challenge to FCRA). Justice Kennedy dissented from the denial of certiorari in the 
latter case, arguing that the D.C. Circuit’s opinion extended First Amendment protections beyond the 
then-precedent established in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
Trans Union LLC v. FTC, 536 U.S. 915 (2002). 
86.   Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 35-A, § 9301(1)(C) (2019). 
87.   Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with Incorporated Memorandum of Law 
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the-moon” argument—hardly auguring success.88 The Court determined 
that the Maine ISP statute was a commercial speech regulation entitled to 
intermediate scrutiny—already a victory for the government—and held that 
its provisions did not so obviously fail that test as to entitle plaintiffs to a 
final judgment at such an early stage of litigation.89 
Because the case remains at an early stage of litigation, it is unwise to 
read too much into this decision. The judge, understandably, ruled 
cautiously given that the record was not yet robust. The Maine law seems 
to have a decent shot of surviving this challenge—if the Court were inclined 
to adopt the reasoning of critics who find privacy laws almost always fatally 
unconstitutional under a maximalist reading of Sorrell, it certainly could 
have done so at an early stage of the case. Instead, it chose to endorse a 
limited reading of Sorrell akin to one adopted by other circuits, in which 
commercial speech regulation survives and is appropriate for privacy 
statutes.90 Many eyes will be on this case as it proceeds through the District 
Court (and likely beyond). 
Finally, the American Civil Liberties Union recently filed a case against 
Clearview, a purveyor of facial recognition technology, alleging violations 
of Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA).91 Based on 
reporting, the ACLU seems to assert that Clearview’s actions are not 
actually speech but is actually conduct,92 and thus not protected by the First 
Amendment under the test articulated in United States v. O’Brien.93 O’Brien 
 
88.   Order on Cross Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings at 10, ACA Connects v. Frey, No. 
1:20-cv-00055-LEW (D. Me. July 7, 2020). 
89.   Id. at 11–14. The Court also dismissed with plaintiffs’ vagueness arguments for similar 
reasons. Id. at 14–20.  
90.   Id. at 11–12. 
91.   740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/1-14/99 (2008); see Davey Alba, A.C.L.U. Accuses Clearview AI 
of Privacy ‘Nightmare Scenario,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/technology/clearview-ai-privacy-lawsuit.html 
[https://perma.cc/9EFS-U46K]. In November 2020, I co-drafted an amicus brief in support of the 
ACLU’s opposition to Clearview’s motion to dismiss on behalf of a group of law professors. Clearview 
argued that BIPA could not satisfy First Amendment scrutiny—a claim that my clients argued against 
in the amicus. 
92.   See id. (quoting an ACLU attorney asserting “Our lawsuit does not challenge Clearview’s 
scraping of images off of social media platforms. . . . It challenges the secret, nonconsensual and 
unlawful capture of individuals’ biometric identifiers from those images. Capturing a face print is 
conduct, not speech.”). See also Complaint, ACLU v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 2020 CH 04353 (Ill. Cir. 
Ct. May 28, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/2020.05.28_aclu-
clearview_complaint_file_stamped.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9NG-KXHZ]. 
93.   391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
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holds that laws that prohibit non-communicative aspects of conduct do not 
violate the First Amendment; the ACLU’s argument appears to be that the 
capture of biometric identifiers from images, rather than the collection of 
images themselves, is not protected speech even under a broad reading of 
Sorrell. This is a creative theory and one that I happen to agree with. Given 
that FCRA—which arguably regulates an analogous process to the one 
described by the ACLU, but for credit reporting—has survived post-Sorrell 
constitutional review, it seems possible that this framing of BIPA could 
sidestep the entire Sorrell framework.94 
Clearview believes that BIPA cannot withstand First Amendment 
scrutiny, disagreeing with the potential O’Brien argument and resorting to 
the standard “privacy vs. speech” fight we have become accustomed to.95 
But Clearview cannot blanketly assert that Sorrell requires strict scrutiny 
for privacy laws or that BIPA cannot meet any standard of review. Beyond 
extant judicial interpretations of other privacy laws, the particular concerns 
that Illinois had about biometric identifiers remain compelling amidst rising 
issues with technology and its use.96  
Surveying this landscape demonstrates that the wealth of recent 
commentary seeking to reconcile privacy and speech has much to commend 
it.97 Those who seek to read Sorrell in its broadest form indulge in a 
dangerous game—prioritizing one constitutional value above any other 
concern — in short-sighted efforts that may leave us trapped without a path 
 
94.   Assuming that one agrees with the ACLU’s apparent framing, if the alleged actions violate 
BIPA and fail to regulate speech, the dynamic set up by Sorrell would not come into play at all. 
95.   See Kashmir Hill, Facial Recognition Start-Up Mounts a First Amendment Defense, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/11/technology/clearview-floyd-abrams.html 
[https://perma.cc/W9KZ-MXUT]. (in which noted First Amendment litigator Floyd Abrams, whom 
Clearview has retained as counsel, asserts “where there is a direct clash between privacy claims and 
well-established First Amendment norms, what would otherwise be appropriate manners of protecting 
privacy have to give way before the constitutional limitations imposed by the First Amendment”, and 
refers to Sorrell as a relevant case). 
96.   See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, Wrongfully Accused by an Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/technology/facial-recognition-arrest.html 
[https://perma.cc/9X8B-6NZ3]. (describing a false match made by a facial recognition algorithm that 
led to an innocent man’s arrest). A recent Illinois Supreme Court decision, People v. Austin, upheld an 
Illinois law that criminalized the nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images in the face of a 
First Amendment challenge; the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case. 2019 IL 123910, cert. 
denied, No. 19-1029, 2020 WL 5882221 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2020). Austin provides another example of how 
privacy laws are likely to withstand First Amendment scrutiny; this argument was made in the ACLU v. 
Clearview amicus that I co-drafted. 
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Ten years ago, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in First 
American Financial v. Edwards, a case ostensibly involving a challenge to 
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act.98 This anodyne description 
obscures the real issue in the case—whether Congress could create a 
statutory right of action that allowed a citizen to sue without showing an 
“actual” injury.99 
Perhaps you still find that dull. But consider the implications of a ruling 
that said “No, Congress cannot.” How would advocacy organizations, who 
may use “testers” to determine whether a landlord is violating the Fair 
Housing Act even though the testers have no actual plans to rent apartments, 
have standing to sue?100 What about a plaintiff who alleged that a company 
had violated a federal environmental statute prohibiting release of a toxic 
aerosol that can cause cancer in fifty percent of the population, but had not 
yet developed cancer? What about a plaintiff who alleged that a company 
had collected more information from the plaintiff than it had claimed it 
would in its privacy policy? 
Perhaps because the justices realized the difficulty in drawing the lines 
of standing in such a way to preserve all the federal causes of action they 
liked and eliminate all the ones they didn’t, the Court took the unusual step 
of dismissing First American as improvidently granted and issuing no 
ruling.101 While the Court did not issue an explanation as to why it granted 
certiorari only to realize a year later that it should not have, it seems likely 
that the justices could not figure out how to coherently resolve the challenge 
that some were eager to take on.102 
 
98.   564 U.S. 1018 (2011) (granting certiorari in part). 
99.   See Christopher Wright, Argument Preview: Standing to Challenge Kickbacks that Do 
Not Directly Affect Price, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 18, 2011), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2011/11/argument-preview-standing-to-challenge-kickbacks-that-do-not-
directly-affect-price/ [https://perma.cc/GYS6-CVWB]. 
100.  The Supreme Court ruled in Havens Realty Corp v. Coleman that such testers do, in fact, 
have standing to sue. 455 U.S. 363 (1982). 
101.  First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 567 U.S. 756, 757 (2012). 
102.   See, e.g., Kevin Russell, First American Financial v. Edwards: Surprising End to a 
Potentially Important Case, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2012), https://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/first-
 







38 Washington University Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 65 
 
That did not stop the Court from trying again to address the issue a few 
years later in Spokeo v. Robins, a case involving Spokeo’s challenge to 
FCRA provisions that it had allegedly violated because it claimed that the 
respondent had not actually suffered an injury.103 The second time around 
proved no easier than the first in finding a principled solution to this 
question. As Justice Scalia had passed away after oral argument, the Spokeo 
decision failed to address the central question presented perhaps because a 
coherent majority, as in First American, was impossible to find. Instead, 
Justice Alito wrote an unsatisfying opinion arguing that the Ninth Circuit 
had failed to properly analyze whether Robins’ injury was “concrete and 
particularized,” remanding the case.104 This finicky analysis is hardly the 
type of ruling one expects when the Supreme Court grants certiorari. Yet 
perhaps because of Justice Scalia’s death or because the Court had not 
solved the problem in the years since First American, a major ruling on the 
bounds of standing once again eluded the Court.105 
I note this line of cases to demonstrate that the Court not infrequently 
finds itself in the position of skepticism or displeasure with an area of the 
law, but fails to figure out a path out of the trap it finds itself—a trap it, in 
some instances, may have actually created in the first place. Commercial 
speech is a similar situation—as discussed previously, multiple Justices 
seem dissatisfied with the Central Hudson framework, but seem unable 
either to find an alternative test or to require strict scrutiny analysis of 
 
american-financial-v-edwards-surprising-end-to-a-potentially-important-case/ [https://perma.cc/QTA7-
NVS3] (“Some Justices may have been concerned that there is no principled way of making these 
distinctions, short of having judges decide which interests or statutory rights are, in their view, 
sufficiently important to be worth suing about.”).  
An unofficial rule of the Court is that majority opinions are equally distributed amongst Justices 
per sitting (to the extent possible). During the sitting when First American was heard, Justice Thomas 
was the only Justice to not write a majority opinion. Thus, it seems possible that he was assigned to write 
the majority but was unable to obtain sufficient votes in support of his opinion.  
103.  136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). In the interests of disclosure, I co-wrote an amicus brief in Spokeo 
in support of respondent on behalf of the Center for Democracy & Technology (my former employer), 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the World Privacy Forum, and New America’s Open Technology 
Institute, which was cited by Justice Ginsburg’s dissent. See Brief for Ctr. for Dem. & Tech. et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (No. 13–1339). 
104.   Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (“We have made it clear time and time again that an injury in 
fact must be both concrete and particularized.” (emphasis original)). 
105.  The Court arguably again faced this problem in Frank v. Gaos, a case challenging the “cy 
pres” doctrine in class action settlements, which also presented a standing question. The Court eventually 
issued a per curiam decision in Gaos remanding the case for further analysis of the standing issue in 
light of Spokeo—because of the complex procedural history in Gaos, that issue had not been addressed. 
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commercial speech.106  
The post-Sorrell world of speech challenges to privacy laws risks 
falling into the same trap as standing for statutory violations or commercial 
speech. The Court has moved perilously close towards a jurisprudence 
under which privacy laws are nearly impossible to craft without concerns 
that they will subject to constitutional challenge under the First 
Amendment. The First Amendment itself has taken an aggressive, 
deregulatory turn. While this Essay has sought to shine a light on a path out 
of this thicket, and there are promising signs that courts may follow that 
path or a similar one, the recent history of the Supreme Court on First 
Amendment cases does not fill one with much hope.  
It seems likely that a privacy statute will come before the Court in the 
coming years. If and when that does happen, the Court should take care to 
analyze the governmental interests in promoting privacy and the very real 
concerns that privacy regulations seek to protect, and will hopefully uphold 
such regulations with more clarity than the analysis presented in Sorrell. 
Too much is at stake to hold otherwise. 
 
106.  See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text. 
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